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The Embassy of Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza to Japan in 1644-1647.

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The Embassy of Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza to Japan in 1644-1647

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The story of this embassy was first dealt with in some detail, in a monograph published by the present writer ten years ago. During the ensuing decade, a number of other contemporary accounts of this mission have come to his knowledge, which, if they do not throw any very new or startling light on the subject, at any rate enable the story to be corrected and expanded in several particulars. From the large number of accounts which have survived, it is clear that the embassy, albeit abortive, aroused great interest at the time, as a comparison of the voluminous contemporary sources will show. Before recapitulating the course of events therefore, it may be as well to give a résumé of the available sources and to assess their relative value.

Bibliographical Introduction

a) **Portuguese.** As is only natural, the fullest accounts of this embassy are to be found in the Portuguese archives. First in importance and extent, though not in point of time, comes an anonymous narrative in the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon, entitled *Relação dos Successos da jornada que fez Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza a Japao, por Embaixador ao Rei daquelas ilhas, enviado por el Rei Nosso Senhor Dom João o Quarto que Deus garde, em Janeiro de 1644*. This relation was printed at Lisbon by the present writer with notes and appendices in 1928, under the title of *Embaixada de Portugal ao Japão em 1647. Relação inédita*, in the belief that it was then unpublished.¹⁾ An annotated English translation appeared in the course of the same year.²⁾ Subsequently however, it transpired that this particular manuscript had already been printed in 1900, by the learned investigator, Aires de Sá, in his two-volume work on Frei Gonçalo Velho, the alleged discoverer of the Azores in 1431. Although the classification of "unpublished" should therefore be rescinded from the 1928 edition, yet the editor can hardly be blamed for believing the

contrary was the case. Not only did the authorities at the Torre do Tombo assure him that the manuscript was in fact unprinted, but it occurred neither to them nor to himself to look for a possible printed version in a book, written about a person entirely unconnected with the embassy, and who had lived and died over two centuries before it took place. Even so, the 1928 edition was not entirely wasted, as it was accompanied by notes and extracts from other contemporary sources—European and Japanese alike—whereas Snr. Aires de Sá's version in 1900 had appeared without any critical apparatus or elucidative notes whatsoever. It may be added that neither the author nor the date of the original *Relação* is known ; but it was obviously composed at the instance of the Secretary, Duarte da Costa Homem, who is given the principal role at the expense of the Ambassador ; it was apparently drawn up at Gôa in 1648, and was used by P^e Antonio Francisco Cardim S.J., when writing his own account of the embassy which was included in his *Batalhas da Companhia de Jesus*, written originally in 1650, but first printed in 1894. Another lengthy account of the Embassy is to be found amongst the vast collection of Jesuit papers conserved in the former Royal (now National) library of the Ajuda Palace at Lisbon. This collection, which goes under the name of *Jesuitas na Asia*, is composed of 59 volumes of transcripts made at the Jesuit College of São Paulo in Macau during the years 1742–7. The account in question forms an appendix to a relation of the war between the Ming and the Manchu dynasties during the years 1642–1647, and is entitled, *Appendix ou Acrecentamento das novas a Relação passada. E trata dos Successos, que teve a Embaixada, que o Serenissimo Rey de Portugal Dom João o 4^o mandou ao Rey de Jappam.*³⁾ So far as I am aware, this is now printed for the first time in its original form, but a full Japanese translation was published by Professor Naojiro Murakami amongst the appendices to his *Nagasaki-Shi Shi* (長崎市史). This version agrees on all important points with the Torre do Tombo *Relação*, but presents some interesting variations in detail which justify its reproduction here. It also gives a fuller account of the preliminary difficulties encountered by the embassy before it finally reached Nagasaki. Neither the author nor the date is given, but from various allusions in the text it is clear that it was written by a Jesuit in Macau shortly after the return of the embassy from Japan in September, 1647.

A third account, partly in diary form, is likewise preserved amongst the Jesuit transcripts at Ajuda. From the title, *Do que succedeo em Jappão com a nossa chegada que foi em 26 de julho de 1647, té partimos de Nangasaqui que foi em 4 de 7bro. Isto se conta por mayor. Esta relação fez hũ homẽ*

fidedigno q̃ foi nos galliões da embaixada, it is clear that it was written by someone aboard the flagship.⁴⁾ It differs from the other two accounts in that it omits all preliminaries prior to the arrival off Nagasaki on 26th July ; but although the shortest, it is in some ways the most interesting version, and as such is worth printing here. So far as I am aware, it has never been reproduced before in any form.

The remaining Portuguese sources referring to this embassy can be briefly dealt with. Amongst the XVIIIth century transcripts of official documents preserved in the Senate House (Leal Senado) at Macau, are some copies of documents of the preceding century. These include a few relating to the sojourn of the Ambassador at Macau in 1645–6, and which are to be found scattered throughout the three volumes of the *Arquivos de Macau* published in 1929–31. For convenience sake, they are collected together and reprinted here in chronological order (Appendix I).

More important perhaps are some stray contemporary copies of various documents relating to this embassy, which I acquired from a Lisbon antiquarian book dealer a few years ago. The principal one is a transcript of the meeting of the Ecclesiastical Council assembled by order of the Viceroy of Portuguese India at Goa in April 1646, to determine whether to alter the Ambassador's formal instructions. It is translated in full here in Appendix II. These papers are probably survivors of copies made for some member of the *Conselho Ultramarino* or Overseas Council, which was entrusted with advising the King on colonial affairs, in a similar way to the modern Colonial Office.

The remaining Portuguese sources for the history of this embassy—or such of them as have any importance—have already been described in my previous works on the subject, to which interested readers are referred for details. The later accounts are mostly scrappy and inaccurate. Even a contemporary—and usually careful—historian like the Conde de Eriçeira in his *Portugal Restaurado*, makes serious errors in the few lines he devotes to the embassy ; later writers, when they mention it at all, only make fresh blunders.

b) **Japanese.** The fullness and accuracy of the contemporary Portuguese accounts are rivalled by those of the Japanese, in the history of whose foreign relations this embassy takes a surprisingly large place. First in interest and importance amongst the Japanese accounts is the *Kuro-fune raichō ki* (黒船來朝記) compiled at the time by a retainer of the Hosokawa (細川) clan which took a large share in the defensive preparations at Nagasaki. The original has not survived, but a copy was printed in the collection of documents relating to foreign affairs known as *Tsukō*

Ichiran (通行一覽) albeit disfigured by numerous printer's errors. A better copy in the Cabinet's Library (内閣文庫), dated *Kwansei* 8 or 1796, but copied from an original of 1699, was printed with notes and annotations by Professor Chōzō Mutō in *Shigaku* (史學) Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 177–202, Tokyo, 1933. The *Tsūkō Ichiran* version was reprinted in more accurate form by Professor N. Murakami as one of the appendices to his *Nagasaki-Shi Shi* (長崎市史), Nagasaki, 1935.⁵⁾

In a later issue of the same volume of *Shigaku* (December, 1933) the indefatigable Professor Mutō printed some other contemporary papers relating to this embassy, or rather, copies thereof. The first of these is a document from the papers of the Ōmura clan, in the Nagasaki Prefectural Library, entitled *Ōmura-ke Oboegaki* (大村家覺書), whilst the others are variants of the same Mss. in other hands. Apart from these printed versions of contemporary XVIIth century accounts, there exist a number of other manuscript accounts in the family archives of those Kyūshū daimyō who were on guard duty at Nagasaki during that time. Amongst these may be mentioned that belonging to the Matsuura (松浦) family of Hirado, of which I possess a copy. It stands to reason that there must be others in the archives of old Kyūshū families like the Kuroda, Nabeshima and Ogasawara, for a discussion of which Professor Mutō's first-quoted article should be consulted.

Apart from these sources in diary or narrative form, there are a number of large-scale maps depicting Nagasaki harbour at the time when the Portuguese galleons were anchored there, surrounded by flotillas of boats by sea and by the levies of the Local Daimyō ashore (August, 1647). Most of these have on them the positions of the various feudal levies, with the numbers of men and ships furnished by each contingent. Though the originals were probably drawn up at the time for the various daimyō concerned, they appear to be based on a single arch-type. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the two oldest such maps extant are one in the collection of the present writer, which was formerly in the possession of a well-known Nagasaki collector and has often been reproduced,⁶⁾ and another which was till lately in the collection of the noted Nagasaki antiquary, Mr. J. Koga.⁷⁾ The former may possibly have been connected with the Hosokawa narrative of the embassy. Both these maps have every appearance of being contemporary with the event they depict, and agree in their principal details. The first-named is on a larger scale and better executed, but the latter appears to be more accurate in several particulars, e.g. in the flags flown by the Portuguese galleons, which are shown as the *quinas* or arms of Portugal in Mr. Koga's copy, whereas the

other shows them flying a white cross on a red ground (an evident blunder for the *Cruz de Christo*, a red cross on a white ground). A third, and obviously later example, belonging to Mr. Tomiyasu (富安), Postmaster of Yanagawa, is reproduced in Professor C. Mutō's last-quoted article, and a fourth version, originating from the Ogasawara clan is preserved in the Library of the Admiralty at Tokyo.⁸⁾

The foregoing items do not by any means exhaust the list of Japanese source materials, for all histories of Nagasaki, commencing with Nishikawa Joken's *Nagasaki Yawagusa* in 1720, give some account of this embassy. But it is clear that they are invariably based upon one or other of the above-quoted sources, of which the *Kuro-Fune Raichō Ki* is the fullest, and to which they add nothing. Passing mention of the embassy is also to be found in compilations like the *Tokugawa Jikki*, though these references are disappointingly meagre. It may be added that the Japanese sources, like the Portuguese, agree pretty closely with each other as regards the main details.

c) **Dutch.** Whether it be true or not that the looker-on sees most of the game, the diary of the Dutch Factory at Deshima in Nagasaki certainly provides us with the liveliest, if not always with the most reliable account of Gonçalo de Siqueira's mission. In striking contrast to the formality of the Portuguese official accounts, and to the colourless impersonality of the Japanese relations, the Dutch version is written with a strongly individual if malicious pen. The writer had clearly no love for the Japanese, and was not specially enamoured of the Portuguese either, so his account is thoroughly impartial except when his personal prejudices get the better of his reasoned judgement. This journal was kept by or under the direction of the then chief of the Dutch factory at Deshima, Willem Versteegen.⁹⁾ It was obviously from this Journal that Domine Valentyn extracted the account which he printed in his monumental *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indie*, (Dordrecht, 1726-8), from which latter source most modern historians have taken the few lines they devote to the subject. The correspondence of Governor-General Van Diemen for the years 1644-7 in the Hague archives, also contains several interesting allusions to this embassy, which were partly utilised by Admiral MacLeod in his *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië* (1602-1650) (Rijswijk, 1927), which is the only other Dutch printed source worth consulting.

The Voyage of the Embassy, 1644-7

The origin of this embassy is closely connected with the Restoration of Portuguese independence and the accession of the Duke of Bragança to the throne of his ancestors, as Dom João IV, in December, 1640. The news of the long-desired separation from Spain reached Goa, the capital of Portuguese India, on the 8th September, 1641. No sooner had Dom João been formally proclaimed on the following day, than the Viceroy, Dom João da Silva Tello, Conde de Aveiras, was approached by the Jesuit Father P^e Antonio Francisco Cardim, Procurator-General of the Province of Japan, who made two suggestions of great moment which directly led to the sending of Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza to Japan over two years later.¹⁰⁾

Father Cardim urged the Viceroy to inform the city of Macau as soon as possible of the establishment of the new régime in Portugal. He pointed out that the Macaonese drove a flourishing trade with Manila, to which place they imported Chinese silk and other goods to the value of over two million in gold yearly. If the news of the Restoration reached Macau whilst the ships carrying these goods were away in Manila, then it was more than likely that the Macaonese might hesitate to recognize their new-found King, for fear of forfeiting their cargoes to the Spaniards. The loss of the Manila trade would in any event be a serious if not a fatal blow to Macau, which since the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639-40, had supported both itself and the flourishing missions in China, Tonkin and Annam on the profits of the Philippine silk trade. The only thing which could make this loss good, would be the restoration of the former profitable commerce with Japan, for the re-opening of which the present occasion afforded a possible opportunity, on the pretext that Portugal's newly-won independence from Spanish control might induce the Japanese to allow the resumption of trade.

Acting on Father Cardim's suggestion, the Conde de Aveiras wrote (albeit somewhat tardily, three months later) to the Captain-General and Senate of Macau, urging them to try to arrange to send an Ambassador from their city to Japan with a view to seeing if friendly relations could be resumed. Not unnaturally the authorities at Macau were both reluctant and unwilling to do this, however desirous they were of re-opening the Japan trade. In the first place, the fate of their own mission in 1640 had convinced them in the most conclusive and gruesome way, that no local envoy had any hope of success. An ambassador dispatched by the Governor of India, Antonio Telles, in 1639, by way of Malacca, had

been prevented from prosecuting his journey on reaching Macau by the news of the execution of the ill-fated Macaonese mission in the following year. Under the circumstances the City of Macau felt that the only hope of success lay in sending a carefully selected envoy direct from Lisbon, supplied with sufficient force and credentials to make himself respected by the Japanese.¹¹⁾

The news of the restoration of Portuguese independence and the letter of the Conde de Aveiras to the authorities, reached Macau at the end of May, 1642. The bearer of the good tidings was a well known local citizen named Antonio Fialho Ferreira, who had left the place in 1637, on account of personal rivalries and intrigues. He had left Portugal by way of England in 1641, and after touching at Bantam, had sailed from Batavia in a Dutch vessel. During his earlier residence in the City he had had great experience of both the Japan and Manila trades, and was consequently in a position to advise as to the best means of obtaining the resumption of the former as an offset to the inevitable loss of the latter.¹²⁾

Shortly after the proclamation of Dom João IV., Antonio Fialho Ferreira was elected as head of a mission from the citizens of Macau, entrusted with the twofold duty of assuring the Monarch of the loyalty of his new lieges—of which they gave tangible proof in the presentation of many of the bronze cannons for which the city was then famous—and of petitioning him to find some means to relieve them in the precarious situation in which they found themselves by the loss of the Manila trade, combined with the slump in the China market owing to the rebellion of Li Tszu and the Tartar invasion of the North. Clearly enough, the only remedy was the immediate resumption of trade with Japan and this was the point on which the City laid most stress and to obtain which they asked the King to send an Ambassador to the Shōgun.

Fialho Ferreira reached Portugal towards the end of 1643, and was able to add his representations to those of the indefatigable Father Cardim, who had arrived from India in the previous year, and was pressing the King to send some ships to Macau as a first step to resuming intercourse with Japan. Although Dom João had numerous other problems to cope with, and could hardly have felt himself as yet secure on the throne, he could not resist the persuasions of two such energetic characters. Possibly Fialho's argument that the Japan trade used to yield over 200,000 ducats annually to the Royal Exchequer proved decisive, but in any case it was decided in principle at the beginning of December that an ambassador should be sent early the following year. Since this decision meant that only a month or six weeks were available in which to select

an Envoy, and to fit out the two ships accompanying him, it is clear that Fialho had brought home to the King the extreme urgency of relieving Macau's plight, if the city was to be saved from complete ruin.¹³⁾

It was now of the first importance to select a suitable ambassador for this difficult and dangerous mission, for which purpose the Conselho Ultramarino, or Council for Overseas (e.g. Colonial) affairs assembled on the 8th December, 1643. They submitted to the King a list of three names, Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza, Theodozio de Oliveira Leite, and Francisco Barroso, all of them gentlemen of noble birth who had served many years with distinction in Asia or in Brasil. Dom João IV. was not long in making up his mind, and three days later he notified the Council that he had selected Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza.¹⁴⁾ It may help us to understand why the Royal choice fell upon this officer, if we examine what we know of his career.

Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza was the son of Ruy Gonçalvez de Siqueira and Dona Phelippa de Castro. Neither the date nor place of his birth are known, nor the year in which he came out to India. His father was Captain of the Moluccas in 1598-1603, and beat off an attack on Tidore by the Dutch under Admiral Van Neck, in 1601. It is highly probable that Gonçalo de Siqueira served under his father at this time, as a Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira is mentioned as taking part in André Furtado de Mendonça's abortive attack on Ternate in 1602. Be this as it may, eleven years later he was appointed *Almirante* or second-in-command to his father when he took out a squadron of seven caravels, manned with Portuguese pilots and sailors, but carrying Spanish troops, to Manila from Cadiz by way of the Cape of Good Hope in 1613-4,—the first time the voyage to the Philippines had ever been attempted round the Cape.

In this connection it is interesting to note the following passage in the *Regimento* given to the Siqueiras for this voyage, and which proves that the Portuguese were still regarded as better mariners than the Spaniards nearly a century after an anonymous companion of Fernão de Magalhães wrote that. . . . "The Portuguese are better sailors and more advanced in nautical science" :^{14a)}

"and you will ensure . . . that good relations are maintained between the Spanish and Portuguese pilots, in such wise that the Portuguese instruct the Spaniards in the art of navigation, taking the latitude of all the islands and lands which you see, with the soundings thereof, and carefully making the necessary observations of the course taken, with due care and vigilance . . . taking in each of the caravels a copy of the *Roteiro* of Gaspar Ferreira, Pilot-Major of my Crown of Portugal, printed at Lisbon in the past year of 1612. (. . . procurareis que la gente baya bien acom-

dada y tratada y que . . . entre los pilotos castellanos y portugueses baya buena correspondencia de maneira que los portugueses bayan instruyendo en la navegacion à los castellanos tomando la altura de las yslas y tierras que tomaredes sondandolas y haziendo con gran cuidado y vigilancia derroteros y observaciones con los apontamientos y advertencias conuenientes para la entera noticia del viaje . . . y el de gaspar ferreira piloto mayor de mi corona de portugal impreso en Lisboa el año passado de 1612 llebando en cada carabela un tanto de ellos^{14b}).

Unfortunately neither Bocarro nor any other contemporary historians give us a full account of this voyage, which must necessarily have been adventurous enough in those little cockleshells of caravels. However, we know that the majority of the squadron reach Manila in August 1614, after touching at Malacca *en route*. It may be added that there was a large Japanese colony in Manila at this time, including the famous Christian Daimyō, Takayama Ukon (Dom Justo), so that even if Gonçalo de Siqueira had not met Japanese before this, he certainly did so now, and hence had some familiarity with the race before his selection as Ambassador in 1643.

Father and son both served for some years in Manila, and took part in the battle of Playa Honda (April, 1617), when the Spanish galleons of Don Juan Ronquillo smashed the Dutch squadron under Ian Dirckszoon Lam. After his father's death (in 1618 ?), Gonçalo de Siqueira returned to Portugal by way of India in 1619, and in recognition of his services in the Far East was appointed captain of the galleon *Misericordia*, which left Lisbon for Goa in the squadron of Antonio Telles in March, 1621. This squadron was so roughly handled by a storm off the bay of the Tagus that it was forced to put back almost at once. Next year Gonçalo de Siqueira left Lisbon for India once more, this time as Captain of the galleon *São Salvador* in the outward-bound fleet of the Viceroy, D. Francisco da Gama, Conde da Vidigueira. The Viceroy—who had parted company with two of his ships on the voyage—had a disastrous action with a combined Anglo-Dutch squadron of six sail off Moçambique in July 1622, in which he lost all his ships save the *São Salvador*, which, cleverly handled by her Captain, succeeded in making the harbour “after giving and receiving many broadsides”. The following month Gonçalo de Siqueira was sent in his galleon to the relief of Ormuz, which had been besieged at the beginning of the year by a large Anglo-Persian force. On reaching Muscat, Siqueira heard that Ormuz had fallen in May, but he remained in the Persian Gulf for nearly a year, harrying the Persian garrisons on the Arabian coast between Ormuz and Muscat, and thus forestalling an attack on this last surviving Portuguese stronghold. On the

arrival of the Captain-General Ruy Freire de Andrade, he served on the Council of War of the Strait of Ormuz, and commanded his galleon in the successful attack on Sohar in May, 1623.

Towards the end of 1623, Gonçalo de Siqueira sailed from Muscat for Goa, and evidently returned to Portugal in the carrack *São Thomé*, the following year. At any rate, we find no further mention of him serving in India or elsewhere until 1641, when he embarked at Lisbon as a volunteer in the naval expedition against Cadiz under the command of the Captain-General Antonio Telles, under whom he had already served twenty years previously. The following year he commanded a galleon, and in 1643 was captain of the *Nossa Senhora de Candelaria*, in the armada of Antonio Telles. In a certificate signed by him as captain of this galleon, in favour of a Brazilian ensign (*alferes*) named Alvaro de Aguilar Osorio, he is styled a *fidalgo da Casa de Sua Magestade e Comendador da Ordem de Christo* (gentleman of His Majesty's Household and Commander of the Order of Christ), from which it was clear he was of noble birth.

On being appointed Ambassador to Japan in December, 1643, he was granted two Habits of the Order of Christ for his two natural sons, a *Commenda* or commandery in the same Order (Santa Maria de Ariões, later substituted by Santa Maria de Terroso) for one of them, and a place as nun in a chapel for one of his illegitimate daughters. He also seems to have inherited a claim to the captaincy of Baçaim from his father, which he renounced at this time. The simultaneous grant of such high ranks in the Order of Christ for his natural sons is most unusual, and clearly shows the high value placed on their father's services, and the King's realisation of the perilous and responsible nature of his mission.

After returning from Japan in 1647, Gonçalo de Siqueira proceeded to Goa, where he died soon after his arrival, presumably in 1648. He never married, but had several natural children, though whether by European or Asiatic mothers is uncertain. One of his sons, Nicolau Rodriguez de Siqueira, was holder of the *Commenda* of Santa Maria de Terroso in 1660, but nothing more is known of him. The other, Pedro Vaz de Siqueira, had a distinguished career in the East, where he served in the *Armada de alto-bordo* (High-seas fleet) under Luis de Mendonça Furtado in 1657–9, recapture of Coullão in 1659, and defence of Cochim; finally settling at Macau, of which place he was Captain-General in 1698–99, and again in 1702. A son of Pedro Vaz de Siqueira, named Antonio de Siqueira de Noronha, also rose to be Captain-General of Macau in 1711–14, whilst a son of this last, Manoel de Camara de Noronha, received

the rank of *Fidalgo Cavalheiro* in October, 1743, and it is possible that descendents of the family still exist in Macau.

Although the date of Gonçalo de Siqueira's birth is unknown, it is probable that he was born about 1587, since an *alvará* of 1644, alluding to his father's services states that the latter had served for 17 successive years in India prior to 1584, when it is implied that he returned to Portugal, and sailed for the East again in 1592. The Dutch Governor-General Van Diemen who saw him at Batavia in 1644 refers to him as a dignified grey-haired old man, which implies he was about sixty. The point is not one of great importance, and it is clear that he was primarily selected as Ambassador because of the years he had spent in the Far-East (1614-1619), and his knowledge of the navigation between the Cape of Good Hope and the China Sea.

That it was Gonçalo de Siqueira's naval and military experience in the East, rather than any diplomatic qualities he may have possessed which was the decisive reason for his selection is confirmed by a contemporary document dated 24th December, 1643.¹⁵⁾ An additional reason for the choice of a man with these apparently diplomatically superfluous qualifications, was that the ships fitted out for the embassy were also destined to sail direct from Lisbon to Macau. As former second-in-command of the squadron of caravels which sailed from Cadiz to Manila via the Cape of Good Hope in 1613-14, Gonçalo de Siqueira was probably the only living Portuguese naval officer who had practical experience of navigating this long and almost unknown route.

Although only nominated as Ambassador in December, 1643, the preparations were pushed on at such a speed that he was able to sail from Lisbon early the following year—at the end of January according to some accounts, or on the 5th February if P^e. Antonio Francisco Cardim is correct. Unfortunately the Ambassador's formal instructions have not been preserved, but from some memoranda drawn up by Father Cardim and Antonio Fialho Ferreira, concerning various points connected therewith, we have some idea of their general tenor. From these documents we know also that the presents destined for the "Emperor" (i.e. Shōgun) of Japan included portraits of the King Dom João IV., his consort D. Luiza de Guzman, and their son and heir, Prince Theodosio. Antonio Fialho in his memorandum, recommended the inclusion of a stand of arms and a broadsword of the finest workmanship, as calculated to appeal to the martial tastes of the Japanese.¹⁶⁾

It is interesting to note that this was the first properly accredited embassy from a European Power to Japan. Previous missions—whether

Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch or English—had only been sent by Viceroy or Governors ; even those which carried letters from the head of a State—such as Saris in 1613—were not so much Ambassadors, as merchants with letters of introduction.

The ubiquitous Antonio Fialho Ferreira had got himself appointed as Captain-Major of the voyage, and as such he accompanied the Ambassador in the flagship *Santo André*. The other galleon, *Santo Antonio de Aveiro* was commanded by Gonçalo Ferraz de Lima, who had accompanied Fialho from Macau in 1642 as a fellow envoy from that city. The bad sailing qualities of the *Santo Antonio* at first caused considerable delay, but after some of the cargo had been re-stowed in the Cabo Verde islands, rapid progress was made, the Cape of Good Hope being reached in under three months “ in a voyage of roses ”. From this point, however, things began to go wrong.

Contrary winds to the South-East of the Cape, kept them beating about in the southern Indian ocean for over two months before they were enabled to steer their course for the N. point of Sumatra, which they only reached with crews decimated by scurvy. After obtaining fresh water and fruit—and narrowly escaping falling into the hands of treacherous natives in so doing—the galleons coasted S.E. towards the strait of Sunda, where they were separated by a violent storm. Disheartened by these repeated setbacks, the *Santo Antonio* made for the Coromandel coast, arriving off Negapatam with only twenty survivors. Even in this parlous plight she was able to beat off an attack by two Dutch ships, with the aid of reinforcements from the shore ; and, news of the conclusion of the Luso-Dutch truce, celebrated at Goa in November, providentially arriving at this time, she was eventually able to proceed to Goa.

Meanwhile the flagship held on her course, and eventually managed to make the port of Bantam on the 6th November, in a dismasted condition and with over fifty of her crew dead or dying. The hapless vessel was kindly received by the English and Dutch residents, but when the authorities at Batavia heard of her arrival they resolved to bring her round there, and hold her as good prize for the Dutch ship *Paauw*, detained by the Portuguese at Goa. This was done, and the *Santo André* remained four months at Batavia, during which time the Ambassador and his countrymen were kindly treated and allowed full freedom of movement. In January, 1645, on hearing of the release of the *Paauw* by the Viceroy at Goa, the Governor-General Van Diemen not only gave the *Santo André* permission to leave, but even supplied her with a pilot and some seamen at the request of Fialho—an act of charity which was later to cost

the Hollanders dear.

Van Diemen has left us an interesting glimpse of the Ambassador in his annual letter to the Directors in Holland at the end of 1644. He tells us that the *Santo André* was a stout Hamburg-built vessel "but the cargo is a very modest one, consisting of inferior wines, oil, olives and other rummage". The cargo was in fact a rather mixed one, for when the galleons left Portugal they carried "50 pipes of wine, 800 jars of oil, 300 hats, 104 ivory Elephants' tusks, and 549 lbs. of coral" according to Portuguese sources.

Regarding the Ambassador and Captain-Major, Van Diemen writes in a jesting way that "on board this ship is a fidalgo named Gonsalo de Siqueira de Sousa, who is travelling to Japan as Ambassador from the new King of Portugal. He is an elderly, grave personage, who lived in Manila many years ago. His reception in Japan will be a shabby one, as may be readily perceived by the advices received from thence, so that this old man may think himself lucky to have lost his voyage thither. Fialho, in his conversation, affirms that the Japanese will be not a little annoyed when they hear that we have detained this gentleman, who comes accredited to the Emperor directly from his King—the more so since the aforesaid Ambassador gives out that he has an order to pay the debts due to the Japanese from the City of Macau, which amount to a very great sum. But all this is mere trifling, since on the contrary we shall please the Japanese in so doing, for their hatred of Christianity is unspeakable, and the Emperor's commands irrevocable".¹⁷⁾

The *Santo André* left Batavia with the first favourable wind of the S.W. monsoon in the spring of 1645, and reached Macau at the end of May. Her arrival caused general rejoicing; the Ambassador was conducted ashore in state, and lodged in a house, well furnished with screens, porcelains, and Oriental rarities, at the City's expense. A few days after his arrival, the City fathers assembled in conclave on the 6th June, and agreed to raise the sum of 40,000 ducats, which the local branch of the Royal Exchequer, nominally responsible for the expenses of the embassy, professed to be unable to supply. But when next day the municipal council got down to the business of discussing ways and means of effecting the embassy, they soon realised that it had no chance whatsoever of success. The reason for this was that Gonçalo de Siqueira had received the most categorical instructions from the King before his departure, that he could *not* promise the Japanese authorities that never under any circumstances would Christian missionaries revisit Japan. The Macaonese knew only too well from the holocaust of their own envoys in

1640, that the Bakufu was in grim earnest when it had issued its edict prohibiting the introduction of Christianity in any form, under pain of death for all connected therewith. To send another embassy under these conditions would be an act of pure madness, and in the circumstances it was reluctantly decided to postpone its departure until receipt of further orders from Portugal. This was confirmed at a general meeting on the 9th June, when it was decided to write to the King, informing him of the hopelessness of sending any embassy to Japan, unless the Ambassador was provided with the most categorical assurances that the dispatch of missionaries to Japan would be stringently prohibited for the future.¹⁸⁾

This was not, however, by any means the end of Gonalo de Siqueira or his embassy. The City of Macau was in such desperate straits with the loss of the valuable Manila and Japan trades, coupled with a grievous slump in the China market due to widespread war and famine consequent on the collapse of the Ming Empire in 1644, that it was clearly impossible to wait over two years for an answer to come from Lisbon. The only alternative was to seek a solution in Goa, and thither accordingly Gonalo de Siqueira repaired at the end of 1645. Despite the calamitous times which the little colony was enduring, the population of Macau was still over 40,000 souls, but most of those who could afford it, were anxious to seek a refuge elsewhere. Accordingly when the Ambassador sailed for Goa in the *Santo Andr *, he was accompanied by a squadron of seven sail, the *S o Pedro*, *N  Sr  da Oliveira*, *N  Sr  da Concei o*, *S o Thom *, *Santa Cruz*, *S o Antonio*, and a smaller vessel, carrying a total of 3,000 souls, including 750 women.

The squadron touched at Malacca in January, 1646, where the pugnacious Fialho at first refused to salute and pay the harbour dues, but the firm attitude adopted by the Governor—Arnold de Vlamingh Van Outshoorn—eventually induced him to do so. Here he gave back the pilot and seamen borrowed at Batavia the previous year, but received, at his request, another six. Incidentally, Fialho, capable and enterprising as he undoubtedly was, seems to have been a singularly difficult man to get on with, and one who had a genius for rubbing everybody up the wrong way. His sojourn at Macau in 1624–37 was a constant tale of lawsuits, accusations and counter-accusations. Even his manner in proclaiming the accession of D. Jo o IV. in 1642 by no means passed uncriticised, albeit in this case unfairly. When he left Macau with the Ambassador in 1645, the City council wrote to the King complaining bitterly that he had lost no opportunity of vexing them during his brief stay in the Colony. Finally, in the course of this voyage to India, his handling

of the fleet came in for some very sharp criticism from the Goa authorities, who accused him and his officers of maintaining very lax discipline over the passengers and crew, who were allowed to indulge in all kinds of irregularities. Fialho Ferreira, however, was not called upon to answer this last accusation before any earthly tribunal, for he died either on the voyage or shortly after reaching Goa.¹⁹⁾

Somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, Gonçalo de Siqueira found the Viceroy at Goa, D. Felipe Mascarenhas, both able and willing to forward the embassy by every means in his power. A ten year's truce had finally been concluded with the Dutch in November, 1644, and it so happened that Portuguese India was then at peace with her Asiatic neighbours for the first (and last) time in many decades.²⁰⁾ Moreover the Hollanders had just paid over a handsome sum by way of compensation for Portuguese ships they had unlawfully seized during the abortive truce of 1642-4. As most of this money was due to ship-owners in Macau, the Viceroy was prepared to devote a large part of it to refitting the embassy for the Japan voyage. But above all it was necessary to give the Ambassador some orders whereby the effect of Dom João's express decision *not* to forbid the sending of missionaries might be watered down or annulled, and for this purpose he convoked a Junta of the chief ecclesiastical and legal luminaries at Goa early in April.

The minutes of this Junta are printed (in translation) in Appendix II *infra* and make most interesting reading. A robust common sense distinguishes most of the opinions expressed, in particular that of Father Antonio de San Felice, O.F.M., titular Archbishop of Mira, and Administrator of the Japan Province. His opinion, which was shared by the majority of the Junta, was that the Embassy had no chance of success, unless the Ambassador was empowered to assure the Japanese authorities that under no circumstances would missionaries be allowed to go to Japan. It was vital that he should be able to give this assurance, for without it there could be no hope of resuming trade between Macau and Japan. The lack of this trade in its turn would react most unfavourably—if not fatally—on the flourishing mission fields in China and Indo-China, which depended for both spiritual and material support on the prosperity of Macau.

Unfortunately it is not stated whether or not the Viceroy accepted the Junta's opinion, but it is to be presumed that he did, in view of the fact he had obviously convoked it to obtain such a decision. On the other hand it seems that Gonçalo de Siqueira must have had some scruples about accepting it, since the sequel tends to show that he did not modify the sense of his original instructions on reaching Japan. At any rate, as

we shall see, the embassy was eventually rejected partly (if not entirely) on the grounds that no such assurance was contained in the King's original letter. This was in fact the case, and it is possible that though the Ambassador assured the Japanese authorities that no missionaries would be sent, they would not be satisfied with anything less than a categorical written statement to this effect from the Portuguese monarch himself. A mere viceregal or ambassadorial verbal declaration they would not regard as sufficiently binding. Subsequent developments seem to prove the accuracy of this last hypothesis.

For the time being, however, the immediate difficulties were surmounted, and having obtained the moral support of the clerical hierarchy, the Viceroy went ahead with his preparations for the embassy. The Ambassador was provided with a fine new flagship, the Porto-built galleon *São João*, whose captain, Antonio Cabral, was appointed Captain-Major instead of the late deceased (though not apparently late lamented) Fialho Ferreira. The *Santo André* was refitted as the flagship's consort under the command of Captain Antonio Gouvea do Valle. Money and men were likewise provided by the Viceroy, who also added some magnificent presents for the Shōgunal Court, if the admittedly untrustworthy account of Tavernier may be trusted for once on this score.²¹⁾ Last but not least, a new Secretary was provided for the Ambassador in the person of one Duarte da Costa Homem, who, whether or not he was a *Christão-novo*, or crypto-Jew, as his enemies asserted, was at any rate an able and energetic man.²²⁾

The newly-found embassy left Goa at the end of May, 1646, and reached Macau on the night of the 27th July. Despite the lateness of the season, it was resolved to continue with the Embassy and a meeting of the City Council three days later resolved to contribute what extra expenses might be necessary to achieve this (*Appendix III, document A*). The galleons accordingly resumed their voyage on the 12th August, though it was already very late in the monsoon. In the latitude of the Ryūkyū islands (in one of which they watered according to a Dutch account) they met with a typhoon which dismasted the *Santo André*, and forced both vessels to put back to Macau, when nearly within sight of their goal.

Even this setback, though it grieved, did not daunt the citizens of Macau, who saw their only hope of material salvation in the speedy resumption of the Japan trade. Appeals for assistance were sent in a swift dispatch boat to the ever-helpful D. Felipe Mascarenhas at Goa, who certainly could not be accused of turning a deaf ear thereto. The Viceroy's response was both prompt and tangible, for in April, 1647, he

sent a pinnace with 12,000 ducats and a quantity of supplies for the embassy. This welcome assistance arrived whilst the galleons were being actively prepared for a renewed attempt, in which the efforts of Gonçalo de Siqueira had been efficaciously seconded by the local lay and clerical authorities amongst whom the Ouvidor, D. João Alvares Carrilho was particularly conspicuous.²³⁾

Thanks to the Ambassador's own determination and to the willing cooperation he had received from all sides, the galleons were enabled to leave for Japan on the 1st July, 1647, accompanied in spirit by the heartfelt prayers of the entire population of Macau. This time no bad weather was encountered, and they appeared off Nagasaki on the morning of July 26th. Before continuing the story of the Ambassador's reception in Japan, it may be as well to glance at what had been happening in that country in the meantime.

It is obvious that the destination of the embassy which had left Lisbon early in 1644, and only reached its goal over three years later, could not have been kept secret from the Japanese in any event, and still less so after the Ambassador's enforced stay of four months at Batavia in 1644-5. Even before the embassy was decided on at Lisbon, however, the possibility of one eventuating had occurred to the Dutch. In May, 1643, Antonio Van Diemen wrote to Jan Elseracq, the Factor at Deshima, instructing him to inform the Nagasaki Bugyō that the new regime in Portugal might serve as an excuse for a fresh attempt by the Portuguese to reopen trade with Japan. More definite information was supplied by Van Diemen's successor, the Governor-General Cornelis Van der Lyn, who informed the Deshima factory in June, 1645, of Gonçalo de Siqueira's involuntary sojourn at Batavia and of his intended destination. Further confirmation of the Portuguese intentions was brought by Dutch ships from Siam and Formosa in the summer of 1646, and was duly passed on to the local authorities by the Factor at Deshima.

The Japanese thus had two years clear warning of the prospective embassy, and preparations were made for mobilising the Kyūshū feudal levies, and strengthening the coast defence against the day when it should materialise. But when they heard that the galleons had been forced to put back to Macau by the typhoon they encountered off the Ryūkyū islands in the autumn of 1646, they seem to have imagined that the Portuguese would not make any further efforts. Consequently they were unpleasantly surprised by the unexpected appearance of the *São João* and *Santo André* in the offing of Nagasaki haven on the morning of July 26th, 1647.

Dispatch boats were at once sent out to hail the two galleons, and ask whence they came and for what purpose. The Portuguese replied that their vessels were galleons of the Crown of Portugal, carrying an Ambassador duly accredited from the new King to the ruler of Japan. After further questions and answers the Japanese retired, evidently convinced of the truth of the replies, whilst the galleons remained anchored between Iwojima (伊王島), (the *Ilha dos Cavallos*, or Island of Horses, of the Portuguese) and Fukuda (福田). The following day was spent in similar fashion, the Japanese asking in particular for the names of the Ambassador, Secretary, and ship's officers.

On the 28th July, the officials and interpreters—who were renegade Christians, known personally to several Macaonese in the galleons—returned with a message from Baba Saburozayemon, the Bugyō of Nagasaki, suggesting that the galleons should come and anchor in the harbour, since it was difficult to carry on negotiations at such a distance. He stated, with commendable frankness, that he could guarantee the safety of the galleons, but not the tenor of the answer which might come from the Rōjū, or Great Councillors, at Yedo, when they heard of the embassy's arrival. The Ambassador decided to accept this proposal, which reflects great credit on his personal courage, since in the prevailing monsoon the galleons would find it very difficult to escape from the harbour once they were inside, and, judging by the fate of the 1640 mission, it seemed most probable that the reply from Yedo would be an uncompromising order to destroy the Portuguese vessels with all on board.²⁴⁾ The Ambassador's decision was supported by his captains and secretary, and the galleons accordingly anchored within the harbour. As they came in, the quays were cleared, and all the citizens were confined within their houses behind closed windows, by order of the Bugyō, so that the town presented a deserted appearance.

On the next day (29th July) the Bugyō sent to the Ambassador asking for a letter stating the object of his mission, together with his instructions so that these could be forwarded to the Rōjū at Yedo for a decision. These were duly given, and sent post-haste to the capital the same day, together with a covering letter from Baba Saburozayemon, explaining what action had hitherto been taken.²⁵⁾ At the time of the ships' arrival, two days previously, an urgent summons had been sent to the principal Kyūshū Daimyō, ordering them to mobilise their levies and concentrate at Nagasaki with all speed, whilst the Bakufu had also been informed by special messenger.

A demand was now made for the surrender of the guns, arms and

ammunition on board the galleons, in accordance with the rule enforced in the case of Dutch and Chinese shipping. Gonçalo de Siqueira politely but firmly refused to comply, pointing out that as a duly accredited Ambassador from a reigning monarch, he was in a quite different category to Dutch or Chinese traders, and vastly superior to any emissary from Siam or Annam, which was the only type of envoy with which the Japanese were accustomed to deal. He maintained this attitude in the face of both threats and protestations by the Japanese, but he consented to take down the cross-flags which the galleons were flying, and to cover up with sail-cloth the Saints' images on their sterns—both of which apparently excited the anti-Christian susceptibilities of the Japanese. However, the galleons were soon allowed to wear their flags again.

Apart from these and other passages over matters of protocol and etiquette—in most of which the Portuguese gained their point—the local authorities maintained an at any rate outwardly friendly attitude. They freely supplied the galleons with water, firewood, and all kinds of fresh provisions, at very cheap rates. The Portuguese accounts make special mention of the excellence and variety of the fruits offered them, which included pears and melons. The firing of salutes was expressly forbidden, after the consternation caused by the giving of one when the galleons first entered the harbour, and which threw all the town into a panic.

Meanwhile the order for the mobilisation and concentration of the feudal levies at Nagasaki was producing satisfactory and speedy results. The first contingent to arrive was that of Kōriki, the Daimyō of Shimabara, who was speedily followed by the contingents of Nabeshima (Saga), Kuroda (Fukuoka), Shimadzu (Satsuma), Tachibana (Yanagawa), Hosokawa (Higo) and the remaining clans. In a very short time over 50,000 men were assembled, and a contemporary Japanese account assures us that never before had such an array of men gathered to guard their country against foreigners. Apart from this unprecedented concentration of troops in Nagasaki itself, all roads leading thither were strictly guarded.

The arrival of the "black ships" (*kurofune*) coupled with the mobilisation of the Kyūshū levies, created a panic amongst the inhabitants of Nagasaki, many of whom fled to the neighbouring hills, thinking that a bombardment by the Portuguese or an attack by the Japanese was imminent. The authorities endeavoured to allay the alarm by giving out that no hostile move would be made against the galleons until the receipt of the Rōjū's decision. If some accounts are to be trusted, the morale of several of the feudal contingents was likewise at a low ebb.

The Deshima Diary of Willem Versteegen is particularly interesting in this respect. As early as the day of the galleons' arrival on the 26th July, he reports that the intention was to lure the Portuguese into the harbour with smooth speeches, after which they would be attacked and destroyed. He describes how the mobilisation of the Kyūshū levies was accelerated, and that a force of 100,000 men, 2,000 ships and 300 guns was being assembled, to deal with two 26-gun galleons manned by only 400 men. Yet, adds Versteegen, notwithstanding that "many hounds are the death of the hare", this attitude was largely one of bluff, and rumours that the galleons carried a mortar, or that they were about to bombard the town, caused general alarm and despondency.

Under the date of August 2nd, he writes, "In short with all this tumult and shouting there is but little done, poor preparations, and indifferent leadership, notwithstanding that the might of the nine provinces of Kyūshū, whereon Nagasaki is situated, with their leaders, and the Governor Saburozayemon, have assembled in conference. . . . A general despondency is evident amongst them all, whether gentle or simple, to such an extent that I am ashamed to describe it with my pen; and I never thought to see in all my days the Japanese so completely non-plussed and discomforted. They ought not to have waited for the order from Court, but should have trapped and destroyed the Portuguese by fair words and lying speeches; but now that everything must of necessity be settled by force of arms alone, there is a continual outcry that it will be too costly in men and so forth; so that in fine they heartily wish the Portuguese may be given permission to leave freely, without anything being attempted against them". Fishermen who put out to sea, had to be paid a tael each to take their ships past the galleons, if the same authority is to be believed.

Although the Japanese authorities had early decided not to take any overtly offensive action against the Portuguese until the notification of the Rōjū's decision, they were very nervous lest the latter should change their minds and warp their ships out of the harbour before the news arrived from Yedo. The practicability of closing the harbour entrance was discussed as early as the 30th July, the original idea (suggested by a retainer of the Daimyō of Nakatsu) being to stretch a stout cable or rope across the narrowest sector. It was soon realised that this would be insufficient, and after some discussion they adopted the plan of a Hosokawa retainer named Nagaoka, to close the entrance by means of a stout boom or bridge of boats.

Preparations were put in hand at the beginning of August and the

work of assembling boats, timber, bamboo and bridging materials was pushed on with the utmost despatch. Meanwhile broad hints were thrown out to the Hollanders that an offer of support from them would be highly appreciated. One Dutch vessel, the *Witte Paard* was already in harbour at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, and three more (*Campen*, *Berkhout* and *Jonker*) arrived from Siam between August 8th and 13th. By way of inducement to the Hollanders, the artillery and ammunition of these vessels was temporarily left on board, contrary to the usual practice. The Dutch refused to be drawn, however, and either feigned not to understand what the Japanese were driving at, or made suitable excuses.

By the end of the first week in August, it was quite clear that the Japanese were making preparations to do something against the galleons, since activity ashore and afloat grew more intense from day to day. The Hollanders were puzzled by the apparent indifference of the Portuguese, and their showing no disposition to leave whilst they still could. Versteegen was uncertain whether this attitude was due to blissful ignorance or to courageous bravado ; in point of fact the Portuguese shrewdly suspected what was afoot, but thought it would be taken as a sign of weakness if they made any counter move or protest. The crew of the flagship had already shown uneasiness when the Japanese demanded that the Portuguese surrender their arms on July 29th, but on this occasion the Ambassador had restored their confidence by a manly appeal to their loyalty. In a brief but effective speech, he pointed out how they had spent four toilsome years in reaching their goal ; now that they had only a few days to wait before finally learning of the success or failure of their mission, it behoved them to be prepared to sacrifice their lives for their King and country ; the further they were from Portugal, the greater their obligation to maintain the honour of their King, and all the more so in the sight of so many actual or potential enemies who were keenly observant of their bearing. This stirring exhortation proved effective, and the men returned to duty, protesting their undying loyalty.

The Portuguese were therefore by no means surprised when dawn on the feast-day of Our Lady of the Assumption (15th August) revealed that the harbour entrance had been closed by a pontoon bridge, which the Japanese were still working to strengthen and prolong. The ships' officers, examining the structure through their telescopes, gave it as their opinion that it was not so strong but that the vessels could not force their way through it with the favourable wind which luckily was blowing ; and several of them offered to lead boarding parties to burn it. Gonçalo

de Siqueira resolutely declined to follow their advice, however, and declared that since he had entered the port of his own free will, he would leave it in the same manner after receiving the reply from Yedo. Nevertheless he did not neglect to take due precautions against surprise, and the galleons were kept cleared for action, with their guns loaded with chain and bar shot, certain to wreak great execution amongst the densely packed Japanese boats, if it should come to a fight.²⁶⁾

Meanwhile the Ambassador sent for the interpreters and asked them the meaning of this unfriendly act. They returned later with some of the local officials, who admitted that the bridge had been made to prevent the Portuguese leaving before word had been received from Yedo. Gonçalo de Siqueira answered courteously but proudly, that the very fact of his entering and remaining in the harbour, in despite of the martial preparations afoot, should have been sufficient proof that he had no intention of leaving prematurely. He added that it would have been the same for the Governor to have stationed a small guard-boat at the entrance, as to block it up with mountains of wood. Duarte da Costa went even further, and told the interpreters that if the Governor needed stout planks to complete the boom, the Portuguese would willingly supply them from the galleons! This courageous attitude considerably impressed the Japanese, who professed themselves perfectly satisfied, and innocent of any malicious intention against the ships.

During the next few days the work of strengthening the bridge went on apace, and when it was completed, its solidity and size aroused the admiration of both Dutch and Portuguese. The actual bridge was composed of three hundred boats covered with stout planks. Ten castles or bulwarks were erected at regular intervals on this superstructure, some of them of three stories and provided with cannon. Two hundred heavily manned ships were massed on either side of the bridge for its further protection, and two gun-platforms mounted with heavy guns on the shore at either end of it. Eight large fireships completed the close defence of the boom, which was garrisoned by a numerous body of archers, musketeers and spearmen. Apart from the 508 vessels and thousands of men on the bridge or in its immediate vicinity, all the neighbouring creeks and inlets were full of heavily-manned craft, whilst the hillsides were covered with the encampments of the flower of Kyūshū soldiery.²⁷⁾ In fact, the scope and extent of the Japanese preparations reads more like an incident connected with the Lilliputians in Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, than a concentration of force to deal with two modest galleons manned by a total of 400 men.

There could obviously be but one outcome if it ever came to an armed clash, but whatever some of them may have felt inwardly, the Portuguese outwardly showed no sign of fear. On the Ambassador's order, the soldiers and sailors kept doubled watches, but passed many of their nights in singing and dancing to the strains of guitars, and the amazement of the Japanese. Not to be outdone in bravado, Sawada Kunaizayemon, a retainer of Omura and a skilled horseman, is said to have appeared on the bridge on a powerful chestnut horse in full armour, brandishing a spear. But doubtless to the secret satisfaction of both sides, things never got more serious than these theatrical gestures.

On the 21st August, news was received that two Commissioners from Yedo were shortly expected to reach the town, bearing the written decision of the Great Council or Rōjū. This news was greeted by the Portuguese with a fanfare of trumpets, and the most varying rumours as to the tenor of the reply were circulated throughout the town. The general consensus of opinion was that it would be favourable, and that the Portuguese would either be allowed trade at Hirado or some such place, or at any rate permitted to leave in peace. On hearing this, Versteegen commented acidly in his Journal. "In short, we now see and know of what sort of stuff the Japanese are made, since they allow themselves to be so daunted by two ships; and this notwithstanding that they have had three full years to complete their preparations, and have assembled the might of the nine and four provinces of Kyūshū and Shikoku. Yet they now tamely let them go, for fear of the damage and loss they may receive in attacking them".

A week later the Commissioners arrived with the decision of the Bakufu. These were Inouye, Chikugo-no-kami, the Chief Inquisitor—who had been mainly responsible for the destruction of the Dutch Factory at Hirado and its removal to Deshima in 1640—and Yamasaki Gompachiro, the fellow Governor of Baba Saburozayemon. The missive they bore was addressed to Kōriki, Settsu-no-Kami, Tadafusa, Hinone Oribe-no-shō, and Baba Saburozayemon, who together with Matsudaira, Chikuzen-no-kami were entrusted with the control of affairs in Nagasaki. It may be remarked in passing that this was typical of the way in which control was exercised by the Shōgunal Government. It was not the leading local Daimyō, like Hosokawa of Higo, who took charge of the situation at Nagasaki, but purely Tokugawa officials, like the Bugyō Baba and Yamasaki,—or to be more accurate these had the controlling voice whilst the Daimyō were associated with them as *primus inter pares* on paper. The full reply of the Rōjū, which, it is interesting to note,

was signed by the full Council of six, and not by only the three ministers who dealt with routine business in rotation,^{27a)} ran as follows :

**Answer by paragraphs which the Emperor of Japan
gave to the Ambassador Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa²⁸⁾**

1. That the Emperor of Japan had executed many Portuguese and Spanish Europeans, forasmuch as despite the ancient prohibition against the preaching of the Christian Law in his domains, the said Portuguese and Spaniards frequently dispatched Padres to Japan, who, converting many Japanese, were thereby the cause of their deaths. Furthermore because the Christians uniting with each other, fomented and plotted many evil deeds.

2. That there is certain proof, that under pretence of propagating the Christian Faith, they had taken foreign kingdoms ; and that they greatly desired to do the same with Japan, as some European Padres who had abandoned the Christian Law here had confessed. Wherefore the Emperor more and more considers this same Law to be totally false and deceitful.

3. That the Emperor of Japan by reason of the two paragraphs aforesaid, stringently forbade the trade, navigation and intercourse of the Portuguese and Spaniards with Japan.

4. That although the Emperor of Japan some years since, proclaimed and decreed that if by any chance any ships of the said kingdoms should come to Japan, all those on board them would be punished with death, yet forasmuch as the Emperor now heard that the King of Portugal had sent the Ambassador to announce the recovery of his Kingdom, and since the Ambassador had entered without fear or constraint into the port of Nagasaki, he did not judge the said Ambassador to be worthy of death.

5. That although the King of Portugal now says that he desires to serve the Emperor of Japan even at the cost of his life, withal there is no reason for such a desire ; however it might be otherwise if in the letter that the King of Portugal wrote to the Emperor of Japan, there had been certain proof that from henceforth the Christian Law would never again be propagated in Japan. Wherefore the Emperor, having prohibited the trade and navigation between Portugal and Japan for so many years solely by reason of the Christian Law, would on no account give ear to any other proposals. In accordance with the above, the Emperor therefore from

henceforth more and more forbids the intercourse of that Kingdom with Japan.

The aforesaid will be explained to the Ambassador in detail, and he will be ordered to return. On the 13th of the 7th month of the 4th year of Xofu (—Shōhō).

Tsushima-no-kami.	Bungo-no-kami	Izu-no-kami. ²⁹⁾
Kaga-no-kami.	Sanuki-no-kami.	Kamon-no-kami.

It would be interesting to know what transpired at the meeting of the Rōjū before a decision was reached as to what attitude was to be adopted towards the embassy, and what motive induced the Councillors to let the Ambassador go free. Unfortunately the bald entries in the *Tokugawa Jikki* and similar works never give us any clue as to the innermost workings of the Bakufu in matters of high policy, so the question is likely to remain unanswered. It would also be interesting to know whether there were some of the Rōjū who were in favour of granting the Portuguese request for readmittance, in the same way as there were some liberal minded spirits who were inclined to respond to Coxinga's appeal for armed intervention on behalf of the Mings against the Manchus in 1658. Above all it would be interesting to know how far the Shōgun Iyemitsu used his own judgement in the matter, and whether his was really the deciding voice. Finally, having decided to reject the Portuguese appeal, it would be interesting to know why the Rōjū allowed the embassy to leave unharmed, when they had dealt so ruthlessly with its predecessor in 1640.

In the absence of concrete evidence on the above points, a little speculation may be permitted. Tavernier implies that the embassy might have succeeded but for the machinations of the Hollander Willem Versteegen, who, he alleges, "played all the pranks he could, used all the contrivances imaginable" to prevent the success of the embassy, and this version has been repeated by later writers who ought to have known better. In point of fact what Tavernier wrote is (like what the soldier said) not evidence. His account of the embassy is demonstrably untrue in easily verifiable particulars, as has been proved elsewhere; and apart from that, the political views of the Dutch merchants at Deshima carried no weight whatsoever in the high councils of the Bakufu. We know indeed from the official correspondence between Batavia and Deshima, that the Factor at Nagasaki had orders to warn the Japanese of its impending arrival and to point out the undesirability of readmitting the Portuguese; but we also know that the Hollanders did not think it necessary to labour the point, or take any special measures; since they were firmly convinced

that the mission would fail anyway in view of the Bakufu's deep-rooted loathing of Christianity.

Amongst the members of the Rōjū, there may have been some who were favourably disposed to consider the Portuguese request, but we have no evidence to prove it, nor any means of knowing what arguments they adduced if they ever dared to broach any. On the whole, however, it seems more likely that from the very first they were unanimously agreed to reject it, and that Iyemitsu was of a like mind. One of the Council, Matsudaira, Idzu-no-Kami, Nobutsuna, had been Commander-in-chief of the government forces which drowned the Shimabara rebellion in blood (April, 1638) and was thus responsible for the extirpation of the last outwardly professing Christians in Japan. The memory of the lives sacrificed on this occasion, and the desire to keep intact the hard-won political unity of Japan, which was based on the exclusion of Roman Catholicism and any influences even remotely connected therewith, was almost certainly the overriding consideration. If this supposition is correct, then the reasons adduced by the Councillors in their reply to the Ambassador were probably the real as well as the ostensible cause for the rejection of his petition.

But if it is fairly clear why the Bakufu stuck to its exclusion or isolationist policy adopted ten years before, there is more room for doubt as to why the embassy escaped the bloody fate of the Macaonese mission in 1640. The Dutch, as we have seen, put it down to sheer cowardice, and assert that the Japanese after making ridiculously exaggerated preparations to exterminate the Portuguese, lost their nerve and tamely let them go. Some colour is lent to this view by the fact that, if the Japanese had not been afraid of the galleons, they would not have assembled over 50,000 men and 2,000 ships to deal with them. But, on the other hand, this hardly applies to the members of the Rōjū, who may perhaps be given the benefit of the doubt that their finer feelings and admiration for the Ambassador's courage persuaded them to let him return unharmed. Possibly—though this is mere surmise—the influence of Abe, Bungo-no-kami, Tadaaki, was exerted on the side of good sense and moderation, for he was a singularly noble and upright character, and has been justly termed the Bakufu's greatest moral asset.

The terms of this Edict were clear and explicit enough, but the Ambassador did not wish to leave without making a final attempt to see whether the door could not be left ajar for the possibility of further negotiations. He accordingly addressed a rescript to the Bugyō, asking if the Commissioners would give their considered opinion as to the likelihood

of another ambassador being received in future, provided that he came with an explicit declaration from the King that no more missionaries would ever be allowed to come to Japan. Even this failed to draw them, however, for they answered that they could not give any opinion on their own authority, deprecated the feasibility of informing the Emperor thereof, and reiterated the injunctions for a speedy departure. That an answer was given at all, was probably due to anxiety lest the Portuguese should vent their disappointment by making forcible reprisals or bombarding the city, of which possibility the authorities were strangely nervous.

In the face of this uncompromising refusal there was nothing left for the Ambassador to do, save to retire with as good a grace as possible, and this was done. September 4th, was the day fixed for the galleons' departure, and they were towed through the narrow passage at the east end of the bridge, which had been made for the purpose. The day was a fine one, and as the vast concourse of samurai stood to their arms whilst the galleons passed by, the Portuguese were deeply impressed by the martial scene and bearing of the men.³⁰⁾ At the same time as the galleons were towed out against the tide with considerable difficulty (one of them grounding for a few moments), a Dutch ship entered the harbour dressed overall with gaily coloured flags and pennants, making a striking contrast to the sober-looking Portuguese ships, which is recorded in all three accounts—Portuguese, Japanese and Dutch. Until the very last, the Japanese were nervous lest the Portuguese should show their disappointment by making some armed demonstration, but nothing of the kind occurred, and once clear of the harbour they hoisted sail and steered for Macau.

Epilogue

The rest of the story is soon told. The Ambassador reached Macau, after an exceptionally quick voyage of eleven days, and returned to Goa early the following year. Here he died, no doubt largely as a result of the hardships his aged if otherwise robust constitution had undergone during the embassy's four-year Odyssey in the India and China seas. The galleons had reached Goa in March or April, 1648, too late for them to return to Portugal that year, but the Viceroy sent them on the 19th January following, together with letters announcing the embassy's failure and the death of the Ambassador. Ill luck seemed to dodge the ships till the end, for of the *Santo André* there is no further trace. The *São João* lost her voyage and was compelled to winter at Bahia in Brazil. From there she came on to Lisbon, where she finally arrived on the 19th January,

1651, two years to the very day since she had left Goa.

By the *São João* the King and his Ministers received, among the papers relating to the embassy, the verdict of the Ecclesiastical Commission assembled at Goa in April, 1646, to consider the legality of prohibiting the sending of missionaries to Japan. The fate of the embassy and the terms of the Rōjū's decision as communicated to the Ambassador, made it clear beyond any possibility of doubt, that the Macaonese were right in their view that no ambassador could hope to be received, unless provided with the most explicit assurance that Christian missionaries would be prohibited from ever returning to Japan.

Dom João IV reluctantly yielded to the inevitable, as force of circumstances compelled him to do a few years later on another somewhat similar occasion.³¹⁾ A letter was accordingly drafted giving the desired assurance that no missionaries would be permitted, and forwarded to the Viceroy at Goa for transmission to Japan if ever an opportunity should occur (Appendix IV). But the chance—if indeed it still existed after the events of 1638–40—had now gone by, if not for ever, at least for two centuries, and the letter was never sent. The wars with Holland and the Arabs of Muscat absorbed all the energies of the Portuguese in India after 1652, and they could never spare a man or a ship to send on so dubious and distant an errand. The pacification of China by the victorious Tartars, and the extension of trade with Timor and Macassar by the enterprising citizens of Macau, also gave that hard-pressed city some relief, and eventually afforded it a not unsatisfactory substitute for the lost Japan trade. A final effort was indeed made to reopen this commerce in 1685, but this was a purely local affair, and likewise had no result.

In other respects, however, the effect of Gonçalo de Siqueira's mission was more lasting. The memory of it was still vivid at the time of the English ship *Return's* visit to Nagasaki in 1673, but even nearly two centuries later, on the occasion of H.M.S. *Phaeton's* unwelcome visit to the port in 1808, a scheme was mooted to blockade her in the same way as the Portuguese galleons in 1647. The Hollanders who had helped Gonçalo de Siqueira with a pilot and some sailors on his voyage from Batavia to Macau in 1645, later had good reason bitterly to regret their kindness. The Japanese displayed such resentment, that it took the Dutch four years and a special envoy from Batavia to allay their suspicions.³²⁾ But even then, they had to promise that in every year for the future they would give notice to the Bakufu of any action by the Portuguese which could conceivably affect Japan; whilst on their side the Japanese authorities periodically warned the Hollanders against con-

tracting any alliance with the Portuguese, until well into the nineteenth century. Such was the lasting impression created by the arrival of Gonçalo de Siqueira's galleons in 1647.

In reviewing the course of the embassy as a whole, it is obvious that the Portuguese come better out of the scrutiny than either Japanese or Dutch. It is true that the Japanese authorities cut a better figure, when all the sources are compared, than they do in the spiteful if lively pages of Versteegen's Diary. Admittedly, they seem to have been unduly scared by the arrival of the two galleons, and their first measures were undoubtedly inspired by panic. But from a purely technical point of view, the construction of the bridge of boats in a single night was a highly creditable achievement ; and although Versteegen sharply criticizes the discipline of the troops at Nagasaki, it is doubtful whether things would have been much better in a contemporary European army of the same size. As regards their treatment of the Portuguese whilst in harbour, this seems to have been on the whole straightforward and polite. Sometimes they tried to take an unfair advantage, as for instance when they told the Portuguese that the officials coming on board the galleons were high court dignitaries, whereas they were really only minor Jacks-in-office under the local Governor. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Japanese were always addicted to this rather childish form of humour, in "getting a rise" out of foreigners by making them pay obeisance to individuals of lower rank than themselves ; the same trick was frequently played on Dutch and Russian envoys in later years. But similar things were not unknown elsewhere, and in any case were preferable to some adopted by other Oriental potentates, like the Persian Shah Nasred-Din, who kept up his prestige in the eyes of his subjects by remarking "Gur-i-padar-ash" (I defile his father's grave) whenever he received a letter in his throne-room from a foreign diplomat.

But although the Japanese can be presented in a more favourable light than some writers are willing to allow, the real hero of the story is incontestably Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza. The courageous persistence with which he overcame successive and unforeseen difficulties before reaching Nagasaki ; the cool courage with which he entered the harbour at the invitation of the Japanese, when there was a very good chance he might never be allowed to leave it alive ; his polite but firm refusal to surrender the ship's guns and ammunition ; the resolution with which he quelled incipient unrest amongst the crew ; his refusal to be panicked into leaving prematurely, when blockaded on the morning of the 15th August ; the serenity with which he awaited the reply from

Yedo whilst ostentatious preparations for offensive action went forward under his eyes ; in short, his whole demeanour at a time when either a rash move or a sign of fear on his part might well have brought about the destruction of the galleons with all on board, resulted instead in “ the arms of His Majesty becoming greatly respected in Japan ; and if the embassy did not achieve its purpose, it was the means of our gaining greater prestige amongst the Japanese, than we would have thought possible.” The Ambassador’s behaviour was chiefly responsible for this result, and we may agree with Father Cardim when he states that Gonalo de Siqueira “ achieved with his prudent valour, what many and most experienced captains might never have been able to attain.”

Notes

- 1) Printed in the *Boletim da Agencia Geral das Colonias*, Numero 38 (Lisboa, 1928) of which 100 reprints were made.
- 2) *A Portuguese Embassy to Japan (1644–1647)* (London, Kegan Paul) 1928. Cf. also *Transactions and Proceedings* of the Japan Society of London, Vol. XXV. It may be added that this version was taken from the India Office transcript of the original Lisbon Mss., neither of which are wholly free from errors, especially the former.
- 3) Codex 49–V–13, folios 43v–51v. Printed in full in Appendix III. *infra*. The transcript in question was badly made by an ignorant copyist, but carefully corrected from the original by Mr. Yoshitomo Okamoto, to whose kindness I owe permission to print it here.
- 4) *Cod.* 49–V–13, folios 573–578 *verso*. A transcript of this Mss. I likewise owe to the courtesy of Mr. Y. Okamoto, celebrated Japanese Lusophile.
- 5) Pp. 120–142. It may be added that Professor Murakami devotes an entire chapter (pp. 485–502), and over a hundred pages of his appendices (pp. 120–224) to this embassy, which occupies a larger space in his monumental history of Nagasaki than any other single event—an interesting indication of the importance attached to this abortive embassy by one of the greatest authorities on the history of Japan’s foreign relations.
- 6) E. g. in Dr. Tokihide Nagayama’s *Kirishitan Shiryō-shū* (Nagasaki, 1924) ; the present writer’s *Embaixada de Portugal ao Japão em 1647*, and its English version *op. cit.*, and finally in Professor Murakami’s *Nagasaki-shi shi*, p. 488.
- 7) Reproduced in Prof. Mutō’s article *Shigaku*, Vol. XII, Part. II, p. 162–3.
- 8) For a full discussion of the *provenance* of these and other maps relating to this embassy see Professor Mutō’s last-quoted article, pp. 169–171. The Yanagawa map is obviously later than 1688, since it depicts the *Tōjin Yashiki* (Chinese Factory) which was only built in that year (=Genroku 1).
- 9) *Rijksarchief-Koloniaal Archief*, 11687. Japans Dagregister sedert 26 July A^o 1647 tot 10 October A^o 1647. Printed in extract in my *A Portuguese Embassy, & c.*, (1928) and in part on pp. 142–166 of Professor N. Murakami’s *Nagasaki-shi shi* (1935).
- 10) Padre Antonio Francisco Cardim, S. J. (1596–1659) was born at Viana do

Alentejo in Portugal. Although never actually in Japan, he held a number of ecclesiastical posts connected with that Province, and worked many years as a missionary in Kwangtung, Tonkin and Siam before returning to Europe in 1642. After spending some years in Lisbon and Rome, he sailed again for the East in 1649, in the galleon *São Lourenço*, of whose shipwreck off the East Coast of Africa he wrote an excellent account. He was the author of several works both in Portuguese and Latin, of which the most extensive, *Batalhas da Companhia de Jesus na sua gloriosa Provincia do Japão*, was only published in 1894. Several shorter works on the Japan martyrs were printed during his lifetime at Rome and Lisbon in 1643-1650, and an interesting account of his captivity in the hands of the Dutch in Ceylon, 1652-5, was printed by H. Fitzler in her *O Cerco de Columbo* (Coimbra, 1928), pp. 64-99, although with some omissions. He died at Macau in 1659.

11) Frazão de Vasconcellos, *A Aclamação del Rei D. João IV em Macau* (Lisboa, 1929), pp. 37-43; C. R. Boxer, *A Aclamação del Rei D. João IV em Goa e Macau* (Lisboa, 1934), pp. 43-45; *Arquivos de Macau* (Macau, 1930), II, pp. 175-6.

12) For a biographical sketch of Antonio Fialho Ferreira, who was born at Cezimbra in Portugal about 1595, and who was settled at Macau since 1624, see Frazão de Vasconcellos, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.

13) “. . . o primeiro ponto della he a embaxada pa o Emperador de Jappão que ha de ser com fidalguo de calidade deste Rn^o no que se deue fazer fundamento pois de Jappão se sustentou aquelle Cidade, e a fazenda de V. Mag^{de} tem o vtil que he notorio, rendendo a viagem todos os annos melhoria de 200 U Cruzados conuem tentarse logo este meio que he o vltimo remedio. Sem este comercio falta de pratta que he o ecencial com que se resguatão todas as riquezas da China, poderá Macao aruinar, particularmente hoje que se fechou o contrato de Manilla, onde tão bem tinham grande socorro de pratta dos Castelhanos” (Memorandum of Antonio Fialho, 1643, reproduced in Frazão de Vasconcellos, *op. cit.*, p. 42-3.

14) The original Portuguese printed in my *Embaixada de Portugal ao Japão em 1647*, p. 37-9. English translation in *A Portuguese Embassy to Japan, 1644-7*, pp. 55-7. The biographical details which follow are based on *Portrarias do Reino*, I, fl. 139-144; Queiroz, *Vida do Veneravel Irmão Pedro de Basto*, fl. 277; Faria y Sousa, *Asia Portuguesa*, III, p. 383; Antonio Bocarro, *Decada XIII*, pp. 291-3, 298; Colin-Pastells, *Labor Evangelico*, I, pp. 202, 217, III, pp. 321-4, 631, 653; Leonardo Argensola, *Conquista de las islas Malucts*, p. 265, 286-288, 290-311.

14a) Os portugueses porque são mays marinheiros, & tem mays industria na arte de avegação, forão mays por diante, & passarão os limites de seu emispherio, onde acharão muytas terras boas, como são as de Maluco, China, Japão, & outras de muyto proueito. (M. de Jong, *Um Roteiro inedito da Circumnavegação de Fernão de Magalhães*, Coimbra, 1937).

14b) Orders dated Madrid, 6. iii. 1613, printed in Colin-Pastells, *Labor Evangelico*, III, pp. 322-3.

15) “. . . tendo V Mg^{de} consideração á qualidade, serviços, e experiencia que nelle concorrem, com tantos annos de assistencia nas partes da India onde occupou os postos de Capitão de mar e guerra, de infantaria, Almirante, Cabo de socorros com poderes de Capitão-mor de Naos da India, Tenente do Capitão General, e do Conselho de guerra no estreito de Ormuz, foi V. Mag^{de} servido nomealo de prezente por Embaixador ao Reino de Japão”. &c. (*Consulta em Lixboa de 24 Dezembro de 1643*).

16) C. R. Boxer, *A Portuguese Embassy &c.*, pp. 61-3.

17) Quoted by N. MacLeod, *De Oost-Indische Compagnie &c.*, II, p. 156-7. The debts owed by the Macaonese to Japan refer to money borrowed from Kyushu merchants on *respondencia*, for which see my essay, *Portuguese commercial voyages to*

Japan 300 years ago (*Trans. Jap. Soc.* London, 1934), Vol. 31, pp. 65–75, and the masterly study of Mr. K. Shiba (柴謙太郎) in *Keizai-shi no kenkyu* (經濟史之研究), Vol. XVII, Nos. 1 & 2, Tokyo, 1937.

18) *Arquivos de Macau*, Vol. III, pp. 5–16. These documents are reprinted here in Appendix I for convenience sake, and with some minor textual errors corrected.

The city fathers very properly pointed out that if the embassy was sent to Japan under these circumstances, not only was it foredoomed to failure, but the Japanese would have little difficulty in destroying the solitary galleon and its sickly crew. This would have a deplorable effect on Portuguese prestige in the East, the more so since the war with Spain absorbed all the energies of the home government and made armed reprisals out of the question.

19) *Brit. Museum, Add. Mss.* 20877, p. 184. MacLeod, *op. cit.* p. 357–8. Frazão de Vasconcellos, *Aclamação del Rei D. João IV em Macau* pp. 12–15. C.R. Boxer, *Portuguese Voyages to Japan 300 years ago*, pp. 53–60.

20) War with the Arabs of Oman broke out in 1648, and lasted intermittently for nearly a century. Hostilities broke out with the Rajahs of the Canara Coast in 1650, and the war with the Dutch was renewed in 1654, lasting till the definite conclusion of peace in 1663.

21) See Tavernier's account and my comments thereon on pp. 43–4 of *A Portuguese Embassy to Japan*. Antonio Cabral was a native of the Azores, and had a long and distinguished naval career of service in Brazil, India and the Atlantic apart from this voyage to Japan. Antonio Gouvea do Valle was born in Lisbon, and had served in the West Indies and Brazil before coming out to India in 1640. On returning from Japan, he settled at Goa where he was still living in 1650. (*O Oriente Portuguez*, tomo IV, p. 280).

22) He served as Factor at Congo (Bandar-Kung) and Envoy to Persia in 1650–52, and had been treasurer at Goa in 1629, amongst other offices. He was a favourite of the Viceroy D. Felipe Mascarenhas, and accused of handling all the latter's bribes “. . . e por este respeito o fes rico e lhe despachou 2 filhas suas com 2 cargos muito grandes e onrados, não tendo ele nenhūs servicos, coizas que deu escandalo por ser este homem culpado e comprehendido sendo rapas com el Rei de Ormus que nesta Cidade de Goa foi queimado pelo peccado mao . . .” (*Brit. Mus. Add. Mss.* 20953, fl. 257 verso).

23) Later assassinated in Baçaim under the curious circumstances related by N. Manucci in his *Storia do Mogor* (ed. Irvine).

24) This was the more so, since the galleons had been warned at Malacca by the Dutch in June, 1646, that the Japanese were expecting the arrival of the Portuguese ships and had made thorough preparations to destroy them.

25) The Ambassador's letter is reproduced in my *Portuguese Embassy*, loc. cit. p. 17–18; (*Embaixada*, p. 15–18) where it is wrongly dated, after the Torre do Tombo copy, the 4th August. 29th July is the correct date.

26) According to Versteegen, the Portuguese threatened to sink any unauthorised boat trying to come alongside their galleons.

27) Versteegen states—at least by implication—that the Japanese forces totalled over 100,000 men, whilst Valentyn, who based his account on Versteegen's Journal, credits the Daimyō of Hakata (Kuroda, 黒田) alone with over 40,000 men. This appears to be an exaggeration however, and both Portuguese and Japanese versions agree in placing the total at just over 50,000 men and 2,000 ships. The *Kuro-fune Raichō-ki* (*Tsūkō Ichiran* edition) gives the total of warships as 731, and men 47,942. The Ōmura documents give a total of 50,444 men and 859 ships, but all these totals appear to be exclusive of non-combatant men and ships.

27a) It may be more accurate to say the full Council of five, since Ii, Kamon-

no-kami, Naotaka, does not seem to have been a member of the Rōjū at this date and was only co-opted with them on especially momentous occasions like the present, to give added weight and responsibility to the decision. The three Ministers who had the chief care of business at this time were Abe, Tsushima-no-kami; Abe, Bungo-no-kami; and Matsudaira, Idzu-no-kami.

28) Another version of this answer drawn up by the Rōjū, was printed on pp. 34–5 of my *A Portuguese Embassy to Japan (1644–1647)*, (London, 1928) but it differs slightly from that now reproduced, which appears to be a more faithful copy of the original. It is from a contemporary copy in my own collection, whilst the former was taken from the *Torre do Tombo* Mss. A third version is given in Appendix III *infra*.

29) These names, which are somewhat bastardized in the original copy, should be identified as below, and not as on pp. 45–6 of *A Portuguese Embassy to Japan*, where some of them are wrongly described.

Abe, Tsushima-no-kami, Shigetsugu, was one of the senior members of the Rōjū to which he had been appointed in 1638, and a devoted follower of Iyemitsu. He committed *junshi* or suicide on Iyemitsu's death in 1651.

Abe, Bungo no kami, Tada-aki, was born in 1600, and became a page to Iyemitsu nine years later. He was given the title of Bungo-no-kami in 1623, and succeeded his father, Abe, Sama-no-suke, as Daimyō of Mibu next year. Nominated one of the Rōjū in 1634, he was promoted to the fief of Oshi (Musashi province) with 50,000 *koku* in 1639. In 1662 he received an additional 30,000 *koku*, retiring nine years later. He died in 1675. A man of upright character, he was also a noted fencer, and once got into trouble with Iyemitsu on this account, as related in W. T. Denning's *Wounded Pride and how it was healed*.

Matsudaira, Izu-no-kami, Nobutsuna, was born in 1596, son of Ōkōchi Kimbei, and was later adopted by his uncle Matsudaira Uyemon Daiyu. Appointed page to Iyemitsu in 1605, and created Izu-no-kami in 1620, he was a member of the Rōjū since 1623, and held successively the fiefs of Oshi (Musashi) and Kawagoe. He was in command of the Government forces which suppressed the Shimabara rebellion in 1638, and subsequently reorganised the coast defences of Nagasaki and district. He died in 1662 at the age of 68.

Hotta, Kaga-no-kami, Masamori, (1606–1651) was a member of the Rōjū since 1641, and committed suicide on the death of Iyemitsu ten years later.

Sakai, Sanuki-no-kami, Tadakatsu, (1587–1662) was made Daimyō of Obama in 1634, and served as Tairō or Regent since about 1644.

Ii, Kamon-no-kami, Naotaka (1590–1659) distinguished himself at the siege of Osaka in 1615 and was made Daimyō of Hikone. He does not appear to have been a member of the Rōjū, but associated with it, in the same way as the *Go-san-ke* were on occasions.

30) “As embarcações estavam em guardas com as suas divizas, mostrando cercado qual dellas de Tonos, e varios Senhores que forão chamados para esta ocasião. E fazia muito aprazível e fermosa vista com suas bandeiras, toldos, galhardetes, e armas lustrosas quanto se podem imaginar”.

31) To obtain the vitally necessary treaty with England he was compelled to agree to Oliver Cromwell's onerous stipulations regarding the freedom of English Protestant merchants at Lisbon from interference by the Inquisition. He is said to have remarked to the English Envoy on this occasion that he was “King of Portugal but not of the Church”.

32) C. R. Boxer, *A true description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam by François Caron and Joost Schouten* (London, 1935), pp. xcvi–xcviii & cxxii.